Implications of Visit of MBZ
Sheikh Mohamed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, President of UAE visited India on 19 January 2026 and entered into an MOU with India on about 12 wide-ranging subjects. He was personally received by Prime Minister of India Shri Narendra Modi at Palam Airport. They traveled together in the same vehicle from Palam to the Prime Minister’s residence at 7, Lok Kalyan Marg. This ‘car diplomacy’ allows for a private, unrecorded conversation where the ‘personal promises’ are made.
His visit was announced just one day before arrival. The visit lasted for about two hours. In two hours he cemented the relations with India in almost all aspects of the concerns of UAE. The ‘Personal Diplomacy’ model, where the physical presence of a leader for a few hours is a more powerful signal than months of bureaucratic cables.
Timing of Visit
There is widespread speculation about the reasons for this visit. There are multiple possibilities.
The visit took place against a backdrop of shifting dynamics in the Gulf. Experts note a recent ‘downturn’ or tension in ties between the UAE and Saudi Arabia. As the UAE navigates these regional complexities, it is leaning into its relationship with India which is viewed as a stable, reliable, and high-growth partner.
MBZ and Prime Minister Modi share a notably close personal rapport. This is MBZ’s third official visit to India as President (and fifth in a decade), highlighting the frequency of high-level engagement between New Delhi and Abu Dhabi.
The UAE is a massive global transshipment hub. Because India and the UAE already have a CEPA (Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement), goods can move between them with minimal or zero duties. It is likely that MBZ wants to ensure that the ‘Rules of Origin’ in the new India-EU deal are compatible with the India-UAE deal.
The India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC), which connects India to Europe via the UAE. It is a center piece for both leaders. India-EU FTA may include specific provisions or ‘investment protections’ that favor the infrastructure projects (ports and rails) that the UAE is funding as part of this corridor.
MBZ is likely to seek assurances that the EU deal won’t give European companies an advantage in the Indian market that would undermine the ‘head start’ UAE companies currently enjoy under the CEPA.
The UAE’s sovereign wealth funds (like ADIA and Mubadala) are looking to invest billions in India’s green energy and tech sectors. If the India-EU FTA sets new standards for Intellectual Property (IP) or Digital Trade, the UAE would want to be ‘at the table’ to ensure their investments are protected under those same high standards.
Another matter is India’s formal involvement in the Gaza Peace Board. Following an invitation from U.S. President Trump, PM Modi and MBZ may have discussed the specific roles India and the UAE will play in the reconstruction and stabilization of Gaza. The UAE is positioning India as a ‘neutral stabilizer’ in the region, which helps balance the interests of various Gulf powers. India is unlikely to join, but that is a matter of discussion in a separate article.
But one thing is sure. The ‘sudden’ nature of visit often points to a fast-moving regional rift. With the reported ‘chill’ in UAE-Saudi relations, MBZ is likely moving fast to anchor his most important Asian partnership (India). The short visit says to the world: ‘I can fly to Delhi and get an audience with the Prime Minister at a moment’s notice.’ That is a massive display of strategic leverage.
By skipping the ceremonial dinners and long briefings, MBZ has made the visit itself the message. It suggests that a specific, high-level understanding has been reached that will likely manifest in the fine print of the India-EU FTA next week.
Humiliation in England
As discussed in the previous article, the legal proceedings in the UK and the resulting divorce of Sheikh Mohammad Rashid Al Maktoum and Princess Haya had geopolitical fallout. The British ‘tactical thought’ allowed a private family dispute to become a weapon against a sovereign (Sheikh Mohammed). In India, the response would be entirely different because of how India treats the ‘Dignity of the Sovereign.’
The West’s failure to grant ‘Sovereign Immunity’ in the Haya case was a strategic blunder of historic proportions. It proved to the Gulf rulers that the West is no longer a ‘Safe Harbor.’
The British Royal family could have intervened and get the matter settled amicably without the public circus but it did not.
By contrast, India’s return of Princess Latifa in 2018 showed MBZ that India understands the unwritten code of kings: You protect my family/sovereignty, and I will protect your trade/strategic interests.
The Agreement
The agreement shows the drift of UAE away from west. The UAE has chosen India as its partner State for business operation apart from its security. The MOU of 19 January 2026 inter alia covered following important matters:
Digital Embassies
A groundbreaking agreement was finalized for the establishment of ‘Digital Embassies’ in India. It is a new concept in the world. These are sovereign data centers located on Indian soil that enjoy full diplomatic immunity.
Unlike Courts in UK, the court in India wouldn’t allow a ‘silly’ lawsuit against a sovereign guest. These Digital Embassies provide a ‘cyber-sanctuary’ where the UAE’s strategic data is immune from local laws and Western digital ‘piracy.’
Dholera: The UAE’s ‘Sovereign Anchor’
UAE’s role in Dholera is not a mere investment rather a Letter of Intent (LoI) authorises the UAE Ministry of Investment to develop an International Airport, a Greenfield Port and an MRO (Maintenance, Repair, and Overhaul) facility in Dholera. Obviously it would be owned and operated by the UAE.
Thus the UAE Ministry of Investment is now the lead partner for the Dholera International Airport and a Greenfield Port.
By controlling the port and airport, the UAE ensures that its trade (like the bullion from Africa) is never subject to a third-party ‘piracy’ or ‘seizure.’ If the West tries to ‘blockade’ the UAE, the UAE’s trade simply shifts its physical base to this ‘Indian Safe Harbor.’
The Security Umbrella:
The ‘Strategic Defence Partnership Framework Agreement’ (signed as a Letter of Intent) explicitly lists ‘Special Operations and Interoperability’ as a core pillar.
Maritime Convergence 2026 is happening as we discuss. The Indian Navy is moving toward ‘Advanced Interoperability’ with the UAE. Starting next month, during Exercise MILAN, we will see the first public drills of Indian Navy frigates ‘shadowing’ UAE commercial vessels. This is the public ‘Keep Off’ sign to anyone eyeing UAE assets on the high seas.
In naval diplomacy, ‘interoperability’ between the Indian Navy and the UAE Navy/National Guard is the legal authorization for Coordinated Patrols. This includes ‘escort’ of commercial vessels.
Silver
Meanwhile a major shipment of UAE-refined Silver Grains has reportedly been logged for delivery into the GIFT City vaults. Thus the UAE is using the CEPA Tariff Rate Quota (TRQ) to supply India’s industrial (Solar/EV) demand directly, bypassing the London (LBMA) pricing system entirely. While New York struggles, the IIBX is settling physical silver at a ‘Physical Premium’ that is effectively setting the new global floor.
The pivot that started in 2019 is complete. UAE and India are now strategic partners with joint security in Arabian Sea and all adjoining region which are in complete control of the Indian Navy.
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